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Abstract
We continue the analysis of quantum-like description of markets
and economics. The approach has roots in the recently developed
quantum game theory and quantum computing. The present paper is
devoted to quantum English auction which are a special class of quan-
tum market games. The approach allows to calculate proﬁt intensities
for various possible strategies.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 03.65.Bz
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent research on quantum computation and quantum information al-
lowed to extend the scope game theory for the quantum world [1]-[4]. We
showed how quantum game theory may be used for describing ﬁnancial
market phenomena [5, 6]. The purpose of this paper is to extent the previ-
ous results to incorporate also quantum version of English auctions. Such a
1generalization is desirable because auctions prevail among market games
and we think that quantum-like approach provide us with more precise
models of market phenomena than the standard ones based on probability
theory. The quantum-like description of market phenomena has a remark-
able chance of gaining favourable reception from the experts. On the other
hand only thorough investigation may reveal if economics already is in or
would ever enter the domain of quantum theory. Quantum computation is
on the verge of being recognized as an autonomous scientiﬁc discipline and
eﬀorts to unify social and physical phenomena should not cause astonish-
ment [7]. It might be that while observing the due ceremonial of everyday
market transaction we are in fact observing capital ﬂows resulting from
quantum games eluding classical description. ” If human decisions can be
traced to microscopic quantum events one would expect that nature would
have taken advantage of quantum computation in evolving complex brains.
In that sense one could indeed say that quantum computers are playing their
market games according to quantum rules” [8].
In the following sections we consider quantum English auctions and an-
alyze possible proﬁts gained under various conditions. Vickrey’s auctions
and various generalizations would be presented in following papers.
2 Quantum bargaining with one-side bidding
Let us consider a particular case of quantum bargaining (
q-bargaining) [5, 6]
in which the ﬁrst player, denoted by -1 for future convenience, sells a
deﬁnite amount of some good and the second one, denoted by
1 want to buy
the good in question. The player
1 proposes a price and the player -1 accept
















1. The transaction in question













































1 are random variables corresponding to prices
at which the respective players withdraw, the withdrawal prices.T h e
random variables
p and
q describe additively proﬁts resulting from price
variations. Their probability densities are equal to squared absolute values












1 (that is their strategies).
Note that the discussed
q-bargaining may result from a situation where
several players have intention of buying but they were outbid by the player
1 (his withdrawal price
c














N). This means that all part in the auction are fermions
and they are subjected to the Pauli exclusion principle according to which
two players cannot occupy the same state. The fermionic character of
q-
bargaining parts ﬁrst noted in [5] in a slightly diﬀerent context. If at the
outset of the auction there are several bidding players then the rationality

































g is the logarithm of the highest bid multiplied by




















































































































The seller is not interested in making the deal with any particular buyer and
the unconditional probability of accomplishing the transaction at the price
c

















If we neglect the problem of determining the probability amplitudes in
(3
)
we easily note that the discussed
q-bargaining is in fact the English auction
(ﬁrst price auction) so popular on markets of rare goods. From the quantum
context it is interesting to note that the formula
(3
) contains wave functions
of payers who were outbid before the end of the bargaining (cf the Pauli
exclusion principle). The probability density of ”measuring” of a concrete
value
q of the random variable
q characterizing the player, according to
the probabilistic interpretation of quantum theory, is equal to the squared




















Physicists normalize wave functions because conservation laws require
that. Therefore the trivial statement that if a market player may be per-
suaded into making a deal or not is a matter of price alone, corresponds to
the physical fact that a particle cannot vanish without any trace.
33 Quantum English auction with
a dominating bidder
The most frequent scenario of an English auction is the one with public
reserve price (bids lower than the reserve price are rejected). The quan-
tum version of such an action may deﬁned as the auction when measures


















)). We cannot identify withdrawal and the reserve prices
in quantum approach because this would result in contradiction because
it would entangle the reserve price with the players -1’ polarization which
forbiden by the Pauli exclusion principle (both players would wind up in
the same polarization state before settlement of the bargain).
We restrict our analysis to quantum English auctions during which the






. The corresponding probability





















p. We will also suppose that
players are allowed to use mixed strategies. In that case the squared abso-











) should be replaced by

































then the auction in question reduces the merchandising mathematician
model [5, 6]t h a ti st o









player -1 strategy being a proper state of the operator of supply
P or opera-
tor of demand
Q if she is selling or buying, respectively. This may happen if
























0-th player oﬀers are to high for the rest of participants.
4 Quantum English auction with identical
strategies of bidders
Let us now consider the class of English auctions with all
N buyers having




), which may be interpreted as the strategy of a equilibrium market with
the mean value of the withdrawal price equal to zero (one may always ﬁnd














































] does not depend on the player. The random variable
￿
q
represents the proﬁts measured by the compound rate of return achieved
by the player -1 in the auction with respect to the average market price
of the good being sold. To measure the proﬁts of the seller is suﬃcient to
notice that her situation is identical to
q-bargaining with ﬁxed polarization.
Her abstract opponent being the Rest of the World [5] might accomplish
the bargaining by bidding price whose logarithm with reversed sing is a
random variable
q
0 with the distribution equal to
N times the distribution
(6


















g (1th-order statistics [10]). The









































































































) (with a ﬁxed withdrawal price
p
0).
Let us recall that
(7
) has a remarkable property of attaining it maximal
value at a ﬁxed point, that, if
q has normal distribution, is a contraction
almost everywhere. Normal distributions play a special role in quantum
market games models because they exhaust the class of positive deﬁnite
pure strategies [5, 6]. They describe also equilibrium markets. Therefore til











) is a contraction then the opponent of bidders may use a natural
method of maximization of her proﬁt intensity. The method consists in
repeated corrections of the withdrawal price up to the value equal to mean




) is not necessary. But if the number of bidders is big the same result








































































1 0.27603 0 –
2 0.410091 0.282095 1.45373
3 0.498606 0.423142 1.17834
4 0.564273 0.514688 1.09634
5 0.616195 0.581482 1.0597
6 0.658949 0.633603 1.04
7 0.695165 0.676089 1.02822
8 0.726489 0.7118 1.02064
9 0.754024 0.742507 1.01551
10 0.77854 0.769376 1.01191




N-dependence become negligible for large values of
N.T a b .1 presents
results gained while using two methods of selection the strategy of ﬁxing




0. The last column of Tab. 1





).I ti so b v i o u s
that the attractiveness of auction consists in not in abilities of the seller
but the rivalry among great number of bidders. The opportunities resulting
from growing number of bidders present Fig. 2.





0 a very good approximation of the prof-
its counted in units
￿ is given by a logarithmic series if the assumption of
































) is valid. The player -1’ proﬁts mea-
sured with respect to the mean value of the logarithm of market price of
the good being sold must be balanced by the loss winning bidder (modulo
the possible brokerage that we neglect). It follows that in case the player -1












N . Therefore the increase in the number of bidders is ad-
vantageous to both sides. It is not possible to reduce the number of players
by forming linear combinations. Such a characteristics being a direct con-
sequence of the quantum no-delete theorem [12] forbids manipulations on
the quantum level and stabilizes the equilibrium gained by pure strategies
of bidders acting as anonymous Rest of the World [6].
5 Proﬁt intensities asymptotic behaviour
The present day growing popularity of internet auctions and almost unlim-
ited access to such auction organized by robots raises the of maximal proﬁt
intensity in English





0) number of bidders. In












3 is no longer














g. To this end it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd the asymptotic

































































































) is the standard normal distribution then the cumulative distribution
function of the random variable
(8
) being the rescaled logarithm of the price
striking the bargain tends to the Gumbel cumulative distribution function



























































2.T h i s












































The diﬀerence between the above function and the previous logarithmic
approximation is plotted in Fig. 3.
Details may be found in Cram´ er’s book [10].
86 Bidder’s proﬁts
Let us consider in detail the case when the player -1 ﬁxes a unique with-
























same strategies implying Gaussian distribution, but the player
k
0 unlike uses

















0. Recall [5, 6] that, in the quantum approach, the logarithm








0 . Therefore the
k

















































) is the standard normal distribution.











1 we recover the standard
q-bargaining of Ref. [6]a n dp l o tw eb e












0. Even if there is only a few
active bidders the
k
0-th player has very limited opportunities of mak ing










0. It is worth to note here that the quantum theory allows to
9multiply positive proﬁts of a bidder that may be meagre in a single auction.
The Pauli exclusion principle does not forbid winning in several auctions if
only the players strategy defeated the rivals (it might not result in buying:
the sellers withdrawal price might be to high). Immediate teleportation of
the state (strategy) [14] makes such quantum market technics possible and
eﬀective. The consequences of the fact that strategies cannot be multiplied
(undividity of attention) [5] resulting from the no-cloning theorem [15]a r e
not explained by classical models. The possibility of eﬀective using the
same strategy at diﬀerent sites allows to make the proﬁts arbitrary large.
This paradox present in classical approaches should incline to research
into quantum market games. The no-cloning theorem may also explain our
ignorance of our and opponents strategy states: the knowledge would mean
cloning.
7 Conditional probabilities in quantum
English auctions
The results presented in the previous there paragraphs have to be modi-
ﬁed if we suppose that the players joining an auction in the circumstances
where the bidders know the prices e
p
k at which they may resell the bought
good and the price e
￿
q-
1 seller paid the good (or the value it presents to













responds to the utilities of auctioned good characterizing the appropriate
players. So all participants know the value (that may depend on the player)
of the good being auctioned. In this case we should substitute the appro-













































































































































10instead of the measure
(3



































have the natural interpretation of demand and supply curves of the
k-th








q)[ 5, 6, 8]. The former












0) and if all strategies are not giﬀens (the positiveness of probability mea-
sure is supposes in prove of the theorem on maximum of proﬁt intensity).
The fascinating class of English
q-auctions with giﬀen strategies requires a
separate analysis.
8 Towards a complete theory of quantum
auction
The analysis of English
q-auction with reversed roles that is bidders are
selling is analogous. More interesting is the case when the polarization of
the








1. In this case the player -1 reveals her
withdrawal price and the player 2 accepts it (and those of the rest of the
players) or not. Such an auction is known as the Vickrey’s auction (or the
second price auction). The winner is obliged to pay the second in decreas-
ing order price from all the bids (and the withdrawal price of the player -1).
In the quantum approach English and Vickrey’s auctions are only special
cases of a phenomenon called
q-auction. In the general case both squared





























vanishing so we have consider them with weights corresponding to these
probabilities. Such a general
q-auction has yet no match on the existing
markets. It should be very interesting to analyse the motivation properties
of
q-auctions eg ﬁnding out when the best strategy is the one corresponding
to the player’s value of the good. The quantum context of the very popular
(cf the 1996 Nobel price justiﬁcation) Vickrey’s auction will be analysed in
a separate paper.
If we consider only positive deﬁnite probability measures then bidder gets
the highest proﬁts in Vickrey’s auction using strategies with public admis-
sion of his valuation of the auctioned good. But it might not be so for
giﬀen strategies because positiveness of measures is supposed in proving
11incentive character of Vickrey’s auctions [16] .T h ep r e s e n c eo fg i ﬀ e n so n
real markets might not be so abstract as it seems to be. Captain Robert
Giﬀen who is supposed to ﬁnd additive measure not being positive deﬁ-
nite but present on existing real market in the forties of the XIX century
[17] probably got ahead of physicists in observing quantum phenomena.
Such departures from the demand low if correctly interpreted do not cause
any problem neither for adepts nor for beginners. Employers have prob-
ably always thought that work supply as function of payment is scarcely
monotonous.
The distinguished by their polarization ﬁrst and second price auctions have
analogues in the Knaster solution to the pragmatic fair division problem
that is with compensatory payments for indivisible parts of the property
[18]. Such a duality might be found even in election systems that as auctions
form procedures of solving fair division problems [19]. It may be that so-
cial frustrations caused by election systems should encourage us to discuss
such topics.
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